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Ambiguity Killed the CFAA 
Prakash S. Patel  
 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (hereinafter “CFAA”) was originally enacted in 
1984 to impose criminal penalties on hackers who attacked vulnerable computer systems by 
uploading threatening programs such as logic bombs, trapdoors, Trojan horses, viruses and 
worms. 
1
  The original 1984 law was criticized because it was narrowly tailored to cover only 
government computers and those involved in the operation of financial institutions. 
2
  As a result, 
Congress amended the language contained in the CFAA to also include non-government 
computers if they fall into the category of “protected computer[s].”3  A “protected computer” is 
defined as any computer:  
exclusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Government, 
or, in the case of a computer not exclusively for such use, used by or for a 
financial institution or the United States Government and the conduct constituting 
the offense affects that use by or for the financial institution or the Government; 
or which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication, 
including a computer located outside the United States that is used in a manner 




Since the Internet is frequently used in interstate and foreign commerce, any computer or other 
electronic devices connected to the Internet become a “protected computer” under the amended 
CFAA definition.
5
  Home computers that are solely used to watch videos and simple emailing, 
however, may not be considered “protected computers” since those activities are not used in 
                                                        
1
 Graham M. Liccardi, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal 
Court, 8 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 155, 160 (2008).   
2
 Mary M. Calkins, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don’t They? An Economic Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory 
Models, 89 Geo. L. J. 171, 179 (2000). 
3
 Id. at 180.   
4
 18 U.S.C.S 1030 §§ 1030(e)(2)(A)-(B)(emphasis added).   
5
 Liccardi, supra note 1, at 160.   
interstate commerce.  Employers have taken advantage of this significant change by bringing 
civil actions against disloyal employees who obtained confidential data from their computer 
systems.
6
  In these situations, the CFAA is not the only weapon in an employer’s arsenal since 
they may also bring a traditional trade secret claim under state law or the Federal statute. 
7
 
Nevertheless, the CFAA is proving to be increasingly popular because the employer only needs 
to show that the employee accessed a computer system without or in excess of authorization and 
do not require that the employee actually obtained any information.
8
  Part I of this article will 
give a short background on traditional state trade secret law to elicit why the CFAA is the 
preferred route for most litigants.  Part II of this article analyzes the benefits and limitations of 
the CFAA in the context of civil claims and how it has been applied to classic employee 
misappropriation cases.  Additionally, Part II analyzes CFAA issues in more recent cases 
involving social network site—MySpace.  Finally, Part III discusses a consistent way courts can 
resolve the ambiguity in the CFAA.  
I. Traditional State Trade Secret Law 
Today, nearly all the states in the United States have laws that protect trade 
secrets.
9
  Most states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) as the basis for 
trade secret misappropriation causes of action.
10
  However, many states have also adopted trade 
secret laws from the Restatement (First) of Torts as well as the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition. The UTSA and the Restatements both provide a definition of trade secret that is 
                                                        
6
 Thomas E. Booms, Hacking into Federal Court: Employee “Authorization” Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse 
Act, 13 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 543, 550 (2011).   
7
 Liccardi, supra note 1, at 158.    
8
 Id. at 157.   
9
 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 35 (Rev. 4
th
 ed. 2007).  
10
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537-659 (2005); 14 U.L.A. 18-19 (Supp. 
2008) (listing the forty-seven jurisdictions that have adopted the UTSA).  
essentially the same: a trade secret is information used in a party’s business that derives 
economic value from its secrecy.
11
  Whether information constitutes a trade secret is, in some 
states, a question of fact for the jury to decide.
12
  In other states the question of whether the 
plaintiff’s information constitutes a trade secret is a mixed question of law and fact.13 
 A plaintiff must prove three essential elements in a state trade secret misappropriation 
claim.
14
  First, the plaintiff must show the information qualifies as a “trade secret” under the 
relevant state’s definition of a trade secret.15 Second, the plaintiff must show he made a 
reasonable effort to preserve the secrecy of the information.
16
  Third, the plaintiff must show the 
defendant procured the trade secret through unlawful means.
17
  
 In order for the plaintiff to prevail on the first element he must demonstrate that the 
information qualifies as a trade secret by showing it meets the state’s definition of a trade secret.  
UTSA defines a trade secret as information including “a formula, pattern, compilation, program, 
device, method, technique or process, that derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and that is 
                                                        
11
 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) (“’Trade Secret’ means 
information…that derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and 
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons....”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §39 (“A trade secret is any information…that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual 
or potential economic advantage over others.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §757 cmt. b (“A trade secret 
may consist of…information which is used in one’s business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an 
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.”).   
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 See Penalty Kick Management Ltd. V. Coca Cola Co., 318 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2003); United Group of Nat. 
Paper Distributors, Inc. v. Vinson, 666 So. 2d 1338 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1996), writ denied, 679 So. 2d 1358 (La. 
1996).  
13
 See S & W Agency, Inc. v. Foremost Ins. Co., 51 F. Supp. 2d 959 (N.D. Iowa 1998); APAC Teleservices, Inc. v. 
McRae, 985 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Iowa 1997); Mediacom Iowa, L.L.C. v. Incorporated City of Spencer, 682 N.W.2d 
62 (Iowa 2004).   
14







the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”18  In a 
state that follows the UTSA, the plaintiff must satisfy all the elements of the UTSA test.  The 
Restatement (First) of Torts lists several factors that courts may consider when determining 
whether a plaintiff’s information is protectable as a trade secret.19  Those factors are: 
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the plaintiff’s] 
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others 
involved in [the plaintiff’s] business; (3) the extent of measures taken by [the 
plaintiff] to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the 
information to [the plaintiff’s business] and to [the plaintiff’s] competitors; (5) 
the amount of effort or money expended by [the plaintiff] in developing the 
information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be 
properly acquired or duplicated by others.
20
 
None of these factors are outcome determinative and instead they are common law 
factors that are instructive guidelines to help courts determine whether a trade secret 
exists under state law.
21
  Thus, the Restatement offers a more indeterminate balancing 
test whereas the UTSA offers more prescriptive requirements.  
 Both the UTSA and the Restatement (First) of Torts also require the plaintiff to 
have made reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information deemed to be a 
trade secret.
22
  What constitutes “reasonable efforts” to maintain secrecy varies 
depending on the circumstance, the size of the company, and its economic resources.
23
   
 After proving the first two elements, the last element requires the plaintiff to show 
that the defendant misappropriated the trade secret in an unlawful or wrongful way. 
                                                        
18
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005). 
19
 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939). 
20
 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939); See also Weigh Systems South, Inc. v. Mark’s Scales 
& Equipment, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 299 (Ark. 2002).   
21
 E.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2003). 
22
 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (including “the extent of measures taken by [the plaintiff] to guard the secrecy of the 
information” among the six factors used to determine whether information is a trade secret).   
23
 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc. 925 F.2d 174 (7
th
 Cir. 1991) (defining the meaning of 
reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy based on an economic analysis); Elmer Miller, Inc. v. Landis, 625 N.E.2d 
338, 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy are different for a small entity than 
they are for a larger entity).   
Pursuing a claim under traditional state trade secret claims is not an easy endeavor.  
Trade secret claims may be denied when plaintiff fails to establish that the information 
was indeed a “trade secret” in contemplation of the law.  Furthermore, trade secret claims 
may be dismissed on the basis for failure to preserve the secrecy of the information. 
Therefore, many plaintiffs prefer to sue in Federal court under the CFAA because it 
lowers the burdens of pleading and proof compared to state trade secret laws.
24
   
 
II. The Very Poorly Drafted Federal Statute: The CFAA 
Congress originally intended the CFAA would be exclusively a criminal statute in order 
to protect confidential information stored on computers belonging to the United States 
government and financial institutions.
25
 In 1994, however, Congress amended the CFAA to add a 
civil remedy to compensate for the monetary damage caused by criminal violations.
26
  
The CFAA’s civil remedy offers corporations and small businesses significant benefits 
against disloyal employees.  First, the CFAA allows federal courts to hear cases under federal 
question jurisdiction without having employers to show the parties’ diversity of citizenship.27  
Federal court is preferred for more complex trade secret litigation because it provides procedural 
benefits such as nationwide service of process.
28
  This procedural benefit cannot be downplayed 
because often in complex trade secret litigation the plaintiff resides in one state, the defendant 
resides in a different state, and both the evidence of trade secret theft and key witnesses are in 
different states around the country.  Litigating this complex type of case in state court might 
require filing motions and proceedings in multiple jurisdictions throughout the country in order 
                                                        
24
 Elizabeth A. Cordello, Commentary: Split Over Unauthorized Use Remains, Daily Rec. (Rochester, N.Y.), Nov. 
16, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 23220555 (“Aside from obtaining federal jurisdiction, the CFAA also is an 
attractive means to pursue former employees in non-compete or trade secret litigation because employers do not 
have to show the existence of an employment agreement, or that the disputed information is confidential.”).  
25
 Id. at 160.  
26
 Id.  
27
 Id. at 156.  
28
 Id.  
to depose key witnesses and obtain relevant evidence.
29
  Nationwide service of process avoids 
this entire situation and saves substantial amounts of time.
30
  Second, once in federal court, 
litigants may attach one or more state law claims for trade secret misappropriation under the 
federal courts supplemental jurisdiction.
31
  Third, the pleading standards under the CFAA are 
much easier to meet then those of state trade secret claims.
32
  Under state law, a plaintiff must 
prove that the misappropriated information constitutes a “trade secret”.33 While this may not be a 
significant hurdle in most instances, there is no such requirement under the CFAA, where the 
plaintiff must simply prove that the accessed information resided on a “protected computer”.  
The last and most distinct advantage of the CFAA is that it protects all intangible computer data 
regardless of whether it is proven a trade secret under state law.
34
 
While trade secret litigation can be very complex so can understanding the provisions of 
the CFAA.  Under the current version of the statute, an insider of the company such as an 
employee or outsider such as a hacker may be civilly liable if he “knowingly causes the 
transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result such conduct, 
intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer,” or if an outsider 
“intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization,” and as a result, “recklessly 
causes damage” or negligently “causes damage.”35 
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 See Roy E. Hofer & Susan F. Gullotti, Presenting the Trade Secret Owner’s Case in Protecting Trade Secrets 
1985, at 145, 160-61 (PLI patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 196, 
1985), available at WL, 196 PLI/Pat 145.  
30
 Id.  
31
 Liccardi, supra note 1, at 157.    
32
 Id. at 156.  
33
 See generally, Rockwell Graphic Sys., v. Dev Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991).   
34
 Id.  
35
 Calkins, supra note 2, at 160.   
 The CFAA provides corporations and small businesses six civil causes of action against 
insiders or outsiders who misappropriate confidential information.  A insider or outsider may be 
civilly liable if he or she:  
1. “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds 
authorized access, and thereby obtains information contained in a financial 
record of a financial institution…,”36 or 
2. “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds 
authorized access, and thereby obtains information from any protected 
computer,”37 or 
3. “knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without 
authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct 
furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of 
the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and 
the value of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period;”38 or 
4. “knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or 
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage 
without authorization, to a protected computer;”39 or 
5. “intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a 
result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage;”40 or 
6. “intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and as a 
result of such conduct causes damage and loss.”41 
The CFAA provides civil relief in the form of compensatory damages or injunctive relief 
to any person who suffers damage or loss.
42
  In order to get civil relief, a litigant must satisfy a 
two part test.  First, the party must prove there is a violation of the CFAA giving rise to one of 
                                                        
36
 Id. § 1030(a)(2)(A). 
37
 Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
38
 Id. § 1030(a)(4). 
39
 Id. § 1030(a)(5)(A). 
40
 Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B). 
41
 Id. § 1030(a)(5)(C).  
42
 Id. § 1030(g).  
the six causes of action enumerated in the statute resulting in damage or loss.
43
  Second, the 
violation must involve at least one of the following aggravating factors, which includes: 
I. loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes of an 
investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United 
States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or 
more other protected computers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value;
44
 or 
II. the modification or impairment, or potential modification or impairment, 




III. physical injury to any person;46 or 
IV. a threat to public health or safety;47 or 
V. damage affecting a computer used by or for an entity of the United States 
Government in furtherance of the administration of justice, national 
defense, or national security;
48
 or 




Notwithstanding the convoluted nature of the CFAA’s provisions, it is proving to be a 
powerful weapon for the protection of electronic data stored on computers and cell phones.
50
  
Despite some clear advantage to state trade secret law, courts are sharply divided whether to 
interpret the CFAA provisions and key terms broadly or narrowly.  The scope and demeanor of 
this interpretation, moreover, is both outcome determinative of the breadth and application of the 
CFAA. 
                                                        
43
 Liccardi, supra note 1, at 162. 
44
 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I). 
45
 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(II). 
46
 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(III). 
47
 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(IV). 
48
 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(V). 
49
 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(VI). 
50
 Liccardi, supra note 1, at 162. 
III. The Broad, Narrow, and Contract-Based Approaches in Interpreting 
“Authorization” 
The focal point of many federal court decisions are on the terms “without authorization” 
and “exceeds authorized access.”51  Federal courts are currently split in determining whether to 
apply a broad view, narrow view, or a contract-based approach to these two terms.
52
  The broad 
view rests on principles of agency law.
53
  It asserts that when an employee has authorization but 
then misuses or steals confidential computer data, he acts contrary to his employer’s interest and 
therefore loses authorization.
54
 The narrow view can be characterized as an objective approach.
55
 
It reasons that an employee who is given permission to access an employer’s computer retains 
that permission even if the employee misappropriates company data thereafter. 
56
  Courts have 
also adopted the contract-based approach that relies on the existent of an explicit or implied 
contract that defines the user’s authorization.57  This latter approach is useful in situations where 
there is an express contract, such as between an employer and an employee, or between a website 




A. Review of the Broad View and its Criticisms 
The seminal case Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc.,
59
 was 
the first to expressly adopt the broad interpretation of the CFAA.  In Shurgard, both the plaintiff 
                                                        
51
 Booms, supra note 6, at 551.   
52




 Id.  
55
 Id. at 552. 
56
 Id.  
57
 See generally Southwest Airlines Co. v. Farechase, Inc., 318 F. Supp 2d 435, 439-40 (N.D. Tex. 2004); 
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 247-51 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d, 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).   
58
 Id.  
59
 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).   
and defendant were direct competitors in the self-storage business.
60
  Plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant was hiring away key employees to obtain the plaintiff’s trade secrets.61  The defendant 
offered a job to Eric Leland, a manager for Shurguard, and before officially leaving Shurgard’s 
employment, Mr. Leland sent emails to the defendant regarding trade secrets and confidential 
information belonging to the plaintiff.
62
  The plaintiff sued under various provisions of the 
CFAA, including § 1030(a)(2)(C), which prohibits “intentionally access[ing] a computer without 
authorization or exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby obtain[ing]…information from any 
protected computer.”63  The defendant sought a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 
plaintiff did not allege that Mr. Leland accessed the information without authorization.
64
 The 
district court adopted the plaintiff’s agency theory, relying upon the Second Restatement of 
Agency, which essentially states “the authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of 
the principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of 
loyalty to the principal.”65  The court held that even though Mr. Leland was initially authorized, 
he lost that authorization when he allegedly obtained and sent the proprietary information to the 
defendant via e-mail.
66
  The Shurgard court’s agency approach interpreting the term 
“authorization” quickly spread to other district courts.67 
Judge Posner in the Seventh Circuit solidified Shurgard’s agency theory by adopting it in 
the case International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin.
68
  In Citrin, the defendant was an 
                                                        
60
 Id.  
61
 Id.  
62
 Id. at 1123.   
63
 Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C). 
64
 Shurgard, F. Supp. 2d at 1124.  
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 See, e.g., George S. May Int’l Co. v. Hostetler, No. 04 C 1606, 2004 WL 1197395, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 28, 2004); 
HUB Grp., Inc. v. Clancy, No. Civ. A. 05-2046, 2006 WL 208684, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2006); Int’l Sec. Mgmt. 
Grp., Inc. v. Sawyer, No. 3:06CV0456, 2006 WL 1638537, at *20-21 (M.D. Tenn. June 6, 2006). 
68
 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006). 
employee of International Airport Centers (“IAC”) who decided to leave the company to go into 
work for himself.
69
  IAC had given the defendant a company laptop for work.
70
  Prior to leaving 
IAC, the defendant installed a “secure-erasure” program on the company laptop and deleted all 
of the data belonging to IAC for which there were no duplicates.
71
  Judge Posner relied on 
agency principles and cited Shurgard as authority to reverse the district court’s dismissal of the 
action under the CFAA.
72
  Judge Posner held that since the defendant “resolved to destroy files 
that incriminated himself and other files that were also the property of [IAC] his employer, in 
violation of the duty of loyalty that agency law imposes,” his authorization to use the company 
laptop had terminated and he was in violation of the CFAA.
73
 
A central problem with the expansive interpretation of the term authorization in the civil 
context is that it has also expanded interpretation of other terms in the CFAA that would also 
broaden criminal liability for defendants.
74
 For example, in Citrin, a central issue was whether 
the defendant “knowingly cause[d] the transmission of a program, information, code, or 
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caused damage without authorization, to 
a protected computer.
75
  The defendant argued that simply erasing a file from a computer is not a 
“transmission.”76  Judge Posner agreed in dicta by stating “[p]ressing a delete or erase key in fact 
transmits a command, but it might be stretching the statute too far (especially since it provides 
criminal as well as civil sanctions for its violation) to consider any typing on a computer 
                                                        
69




 Id.  
72
 Id. at 420. 
73
 Id. at 420.  
74
 Warren Thomas, Lenity on me: LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka Points the Way Toward Defining Authorization 
and Solving the Split Over the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 27 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 379, 380-81 (2011).   
75
 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 419 (citing 18 U.S.C § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) (emphasis added)).  
76
 Id.  
keyboard to be a form of “transmission” just because it transmits a command to the computer.77   
If such broad interpretations of terms such as transmission or authorization remain unchecked, 
they could cause chaos among litigants and threaten defendants with greater criminal and civil 
liability then the CFAA contemplated.
78
   
Another problem with reading agency principles into the CFAA is that employers will 
always have a federal cause of action whenever employees access the company computer with so 
called “adverse interests.”  Employees routinely use “protected computers” throughout their 
workday to check personal email, weather, or fantasy football and under the broad view if these 
activities are done without permission and inadvertently cause damage, it may give rise to CFAA 
liability.  Moreover, the broad construction of the CFAA will place an undue administrative 
burden on federal courts because it will force them to resolve disputes brought by employers 
against employees, suits traditionally in the province of state courts, which also seem too 
implicate the state more so than federal interests.   
B. The Narrow View and its Criticisms. 
While Shurgard, Citrin, and their progeny have applied a broad application of the term 
“without authorization”, other courts have applied a more narrow interpretation.  In Lockheed 
Martin Corp. v. Speed
79
 the court was not persuaded by the analysis in either Citrin or Shurgard 
and instead chose to narrowly interpret the term “without authorization.”80  The plaintiff, 
Lockheed Martin Corporation, filed suit against three former employees who allegedly copied 
confidential and proprietary information before resigning from their positions and accepting 
employment at a rival defense contractor who was conspiring to gain an unfair advantage over 




 Id.  
79
  No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006). 
80
  Id. at *4 (“Both cases rely heavily on extrinsic materials, particularly the Second Restatement of Agency (Citrin 
and Shurgard) and legislative history (Shurgard), to derive the meaning of “without authorization”). 
Lockheed to get bids for an Air Force contract.
81
  Lockheed essentially alleged that the former 
employees knowingly and with the intent to defraud accessed a protected computer without 
authorization or by exceeding their authorization and obtained anything of value worth more 
than $5,000 and recklessly caused damage.
82
  Lockheed attempted to argue, as in Citrin and 
Shurgard, that the employees terminated their authority when they accessed confidential data 
with intent to steal and deliver the data to a competitor.
83
  The court refused to adopt the agency 
theory and instead relied on the “plain language” of the CFAA84 and essentially grouped 
employees in three categories: (i) employees acting with authorization; (ii) employees acting 
without authorization; and (iii) employees who exceed their authorization.
85
  Applying a plain 
dictionary definition of authorization, the court held the “employees accessed with 
authorization”86 and did not exceed their authorization because Lockheed had given the 
employees permission to access the company computer for the precise data at issue.
87
   
A federal district court in Maryland in the case International Association of Machinists 
and Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda followed the reasoning in Speed.
88
  In that case, 
defendant Werner-Masuda, the Secretary-Treasurer of a Local Chapter of the plaintiff Union had 
signed an agreement that gave her access to the Union’s online membership database.89  The 
defendant later gave confidential membership information to the Union of Independent Flight 
                                                        
81
 Id. at *1. 
82
 Id.   
83
 Id. at *4. 
84
 Id. at *5. 
85 Id. ([I]t is plain from the outset that Congress singled out two groups of accessers, those “without authorization” 
(or those below authorization, meaning those having no permission to access whatsoever-typically outsiders, as well 
as insiders that are not permitted any computer access) and those exceeding authorization (or those above 
authorization, meaning those that go beyond the permitted access granted to them-typically insiders exceeding 
whatever access is permitted to them). 
86 Id. (Specifically, defendant Speed had “complete access,” defendant Fleming had “unrestricted access,” and 
defendant St. Romain had “access’ to the files). 
87
 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
88
 390 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Md. 2005). 
89
 Id. at 483. 
Attendants (“UIFA”) which was competing against the International Association of Machinists 
and Aerospace Workers (“IAM”).90  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated the 
CFAA because she exceeded her authorization under her signed agreement with IAM.
91
  The 
court held that under the plain meaning of the statute, the defendant did not exceed her 
authorized access because in her capacity as a Secretary-treasurer, she was given permission to 
access the membership list and IAM did not terminate her authorization at any point.
92
 
The Ninth Circuit in LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka also rejected the agency approach 
followed by Citrin and Shurgard and instead applied an objective standard.
93
  In Brekka the 
employer accused the employee, Christopher Brekka (“Chris”), of e-mailing confidential 
company data to his personal e-mail account.
94
  The court affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employee because he was authorized to use 
LVRC’s computers while he was employed at LVRC and therefore he could not have accessed a 
computer “without authorization” when he emailed documents to himself prior to leaving 
LVRC.
95
  The court also held that the employee did not “exceed authorized access” because he 
was entitled to obtain the documents.
96
   
The proponents of the “narrow view” set out several rationales as to why “authorization” 
should be interpreted narrowly in employer-employee misappropriation cases.  First, the CFAA’s 
silence as to the meaning of “authorization” compels the court to start with the plain meaning of 
the statute and its terms.
97
  The court stated, “it is a fundamental canon of statutory construction” 
that when a statute does not define a particular term, words will be interpreted in their “ordinary, 
                                                        
90
 Id.  
91
 Id. at 495.   
92
 Id. at 499.  
93
 581 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2009). 
94






 Id. at 1132 
contemporary, common meaning.”98  The court looked to the dictionary definition of 
authorization and concluded that it is defined as “permission or power granted by an authority”99 
and authorize means “to endorse, empower, justify, permit by or as if by some recognized or 
property authority.”100 Based on this definition, the court concluded that an employer grants an 
employee “authorization” to access a company computer when the employer gives the employee 
permission to use it.
101
   
Second, the rule of lenity and canon of avoiding absurd results favor a narrow 
construction of the CFAA.
102
  The rule of lenity states that courts should resolve any ambiguity 
in a criminal statute in favor of the defendant.
103
  The Supreme Court has warned against 
interpreting criminal statutes in unanticipated and novel ways that impose unexpected burdens on 
defendants.
104
  Since employees would have no reason to know that making personal use of a 
company computer is a breach of a “fiduciary duty of loyalty” to an employer it would be 
improper for courts to interpret the CFAA in such an unanticipated manner.
105
  Moreover, the 
rule of lenity applies in the civil context because when a statute has “both criminal and 
noncriminal application, courts must interpret both contexts consistently.”106  Courts have also 
found that reading agency principles into the CFAA may hand down potentially absurd results 
therefore the narrow interpretation is a more sensible approach.
107
  The Lockheed court noted 
that reading agency principles into the CFAA will give employers a federal cause of action 
whenever employees access the company computer with “adverse interests” and accidentally 
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 Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058 at 7 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006). 
cause some type of damage or loss.
108
  It is common for employers to routinely use “protected 
computers” with adverse interests unrelated to an employer’s business throughout the workday109 
whether it be checking the weather, news, sports, or their Facebook.  These types of activities, if 
done without permission and accidentally causing damage, may give rise to CFAA liability 
under the broad agency interpretation of “authorization.”110   
Third, the legislative history and congressional intent support a finding of narrow 
construction.
111
  Congress initially enacted the CFAA to create a cause of action against 
computer hackers.
112
  The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York has stated 
that “Congress was endeavoring to outlaw computer hacking and electronic trespassing [and] not 
providing a new means of addressing the unfaithful employee [misappropriation] situations.”113  
Furthermore, in 1986 Congress amended the CFAA to narrow the sweep of the statute by 
removing one of the “murkier grounds of liability, under which a person’s access to 
computerized data might be legitimate in [one] circumstance, but criminal in [another nearly 
identical] circumstance.”114  The amendment eliminated any reference to a defendant’s purpose 
for accessing information, and instead focused solely on access.
115
  Also, the Senate reports 
emphasize that Congress was more concerned with “outsiders” such as computer hackers rather 
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than “insiders” such as employees when passing the CFAA.116  Therefore, it is clear that 
Congress intended to eliminate hacking instead of regulating or monitoring an employee’s 
subsequent use of computer data after initial access is granted.
117
     
Lastly, the proponents of the narrow view cite that efficient judicial administration 
requires courts to interpret the CFAA narrowly.
118
  A broad interpretation of the CFAA places an 
undue burden on the federal court system because it forces them to resolve cases brought by 
employers against employees, suits which are traditionally within the province of state courts.
119
  
Furthermore, because of the federal courts supplemental jurisdiction they will also have to hear 
derivative claims related to the CFAA claim arising from the same case or controversy and 
therefore cause the federal system to be both inefficient and expensive to maintain.
120
   
The narrow view has very few criticisms noted in court opinions because it is a more 
sensible and clear approach to the interpretation of the CFAA.  However, one major criticism is 
that the narrow view does not provide the flexibility to combat the ever-evolving world of 
computer crimes.
121
  Taking the more narrow approach of “authorization” would preclude courts 
to find liability in the infrequent circumstances that may warrant it.
122
  Furthermore, the narrow 
view would preclude many suits arising from disloyal employees for the sole benefit of reducing 
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the federal case load.
123
  This could potentially eliminate the benefit of a uniform body of law in 
the disloyal employee scenarios.
124
   
C. The Contract-Based Approach and its Limitations 
The First Circuit in United States v. Czubinski used the contract-based approach in 
interpreting the term “authorization.”125  The defendant Czubinski was employed as a Contact 
Representative for the Taxpayer Services Division of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).126  
To perform his duties as an employee he would regularly access information from the IRS’s 
computer database which included looking at individuals’ private income tax return 
information.
127
  The IRS’s Rules of Conduct, which was signed by Czubinski, clearly stated that 
employees who had passwords and access codes were not allowed to access files outside the 
course of their official duties.
128
  He knowingly disregarded IRS rules by looking at confidential 
information obtained by performing unauthorized searches outside the scope of his duties.
129
  An 
internal IRS audit revealed that Czubinski accessed information regarding: the joint tax return of 
an assistant district attorney who had been prosecuting Czubinski’s father on an unrelated felony 
offense and his wife; tax returns of two individuals involved in the David Duke presidential 
campaign; and the tax return of a woman Czubinski had dated a few times; and tax returns of 
other various individuals.
130
  However, the government admitted that he did not do “anything 
more than knowingly disregard IRS rules by observing the confidential information he accessed” 
because he never used the data.
131
  At trial, a jury convicted Czubinski of violating 18 U.S.C. 
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§1030 (a)(4) that required that he access the computer either without authorization or in excess 
of authorization, and obtain something of value.
132
  The court agreed that Czubinski exceeded his 
authorized access, which the IRS rules of conduct clearly outlined, but reversed his conviction 
because he did not deprive the IRS of any property of value when he exceeded his 
authorization.
133
  While the court may have dismissed his convictions, the holding supports the 
proposition that employers are able to “contractually define the limits of authority,” and courts 
can use these contracts to determine whether an individual has surpassed his authorized 
access.
134
 More importantly, the First Circuit concluded its discussion with a warning of the 
CFAA’s terms and the inherent danger it presents because “[Czubinski’s conduct], although 
offensive to the morals or aesthetics of federal prosecutors, cannot reasonably be expected to 
form the basis of a federal felony.”135 
Twelve years later the federal district court in United States v. Drew
136
 reiterated this 
vagueness warning.  This case raises the real possibility that the Supreme Court may choose to 
rule on the vagueness in the CFAA for the first time to provide some clarity for the future.  Lori 
Drew, an adult resident of O’Fallon, Missouri, allegedly created a conspiracy to intentionally 
access a computer used in interstate commerce without and or in excess of authorization in order 
to obtain information for the purpose of committing the tortious act of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress upon a 13-year old girl named Megan Meier through the social networking 
website MySpace.
137
  Megan was a classmate of Lori Drew’s daughter, Sarah.138  Pursuant to the 
conspiracy, the conspirators established a profile for a fictitious 16 year old male named “Josh 
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137
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138
 Id. 
Evans” on the website www.myspace.com.139  The conspirators also posted a photo of a boy on 
this website without that boy’s knowledge or consent.140  The conduct violated the terms of 
service of the MySpace website which prohibited providing information that the user knew was 
false or misleading.
141
  The website also prohibited including a photograph of another person 
without that person’s consent.142  Lori Drew and the other conspirators contacted Megan through 
the “Josh Evan” fake profile and flirted with her for several days.143  Later, “Josh” informed 
Megan that he was moving and told her “he no longer liked her” and that “the world would be a 
better place without her.”144  Megan committed suicide after reading that message.145  After 
learning that Megan had killed herself, Lori Drew quickly deleted the “Josh Evans” Myspace 
profile.
146
   
The prosecutor charged Lori Drew with one count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§371 and three counts of violating a felony portion of the CFAA which prohibits accessing a 
computer without authorization or in excess of authorization and obtaining information from a 
protected computer where the conduct involves an interstate or foreign communication and the 
offense is committed in furtherance of a crime or tortious act.
147
  At the beginning of the court’s 
opinion, it noted that nothing in the legislative history of the CFAA suggests that Congress 
envisioned a cyberbullying prosecution under the statute.
148
  Judge Wu of the Central District of 
California addressed the central issue raised by Drew: whether a computer user’s intentional 
violation of one or more provision in an Internet website’s terms of service satisfies the first 
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148
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element of the CFAA’s section 1030(a)(2)(C): whether the defendant intentionally accessed a 
computer either without authorization or in excess of their authorization.
149
  Judge Wu noted that 
three important terms are not sufficiently defined within the first element: “intentionally,” 
“access a computer”, and “without authorization” and that the latter two terms have caused 
considerable amount of controversy as to their meaning.
150
  More importantly the court noted 
that the interpretation of the term “without authorization” has taken a number of different 
approaches in the federal court system including the agency approach, the broad approach and 
the contract based approach.
151
  Judge Wu chose to examine “without authorization” in the 
breach of contract context where most courts have held that an intentional or conscious violation 
of a website’s terms of service will render the access unauthorized.152  Under this interpretation, 
the court held “that an intentional breach of the [MySpace Terms of Service] can potentially 
constitute accessing the MySpace computer/server without authorization and/or in excess of 
authorization under the statute” satisfying the first element of Section 1030(a)(2)(C).153 Drew’s 
ruling is consistent with other cases such as EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zerfer Corp.,
154
 which has 
held that “a lack of authorization could be established by an explicit statement on the website 
restricting access.”155 
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After the court established that Drew’s conscious violation of the MySpace Terms of 
Service constituted a violation under the CFAA, the next issue was whether the CFAA 
withstands the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
156
  The void-for-vagueness doctrine has two prongs: 
(1) the offense must have “relatively clear guidelines” so an ordinary person can understand what 
conduct is illegal; and (2) the law must give some minimal “objective criteria” to assist law 
enforcement agencies in its application.
157
 The court, quoting Justice Holmes, observed that, as 
to criminal statutes, there is a “fair warning” requirement:  
“Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law 
before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the 
world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends 
to do if a certain line is passed.  To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line 
should be clear.
158
   
Judge Wu concluded that basing a CFAA violation upon the conscious violation of a website’s 
terms of service runs afoul of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, because of the absence of 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement and because of actual notice deficiencies.
159
   
The court states four arguments to conclude that the CFAA neither explicitly states nor 
implicitly suggests that breaches of contract are criminalized.
160
  First, the language contained in 
the CFAA does not explicitly state that the CFAA has “criminalized breaches of contract” in the 
context of website terms of service.
161
  Normal breaches of contract are not subject to criminal 
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prosecution.
162
  Therefore, “ordinary people” may expect to be exposed to civil claims for 
violating a contractual provision but they would not expect criminal prosecution.
163
  Second, 
Section 1030 is ambiguous in explaining which violations if any constitute unauthorized 
access.
164
  The court found that if any conscious breach of a website’s terms of service is 
sufficient to establish a violation of the CFAA, the law would afford too much discretion to the 
police and too little notice to citizens who wish to use the Internet.
165
  Third, by allowing website 
owners to define when a CFAA violation occurs will ultimately put the website owners in the 
position of the “lawmaker” which will only lead to further vagueness problems.166  For example, 
the MySpace Terms of Service prohibits its members from posting in “band and filmmaker 
profiles…sexually suggestive imagery or any other unfair…[c]ontent intended to draw traffic to 
the profile.”167  It is unclear from this provision what “sexually suggestive imagery” and “unfair 
content” means or entails.168  Finally, a level of indefiniteness arises when applying contract law 
in general and/or other contractual requirements within the applicable terms of service to any 
criminal prosecution.
169
  For example, the MySpace Terms of Service included an arbitration 
clause for “any dispute” arising between the service provider and a visitor/member/user. 170 
Therefore, before a breach of a term of service can be found or the ability of MySpace to 
terminate the visitor/member/user’s access to the site can be determine, the issue would be 
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  This would raise the question as to whether a finding of breach of 
authorization can be made without arbitration.
172
 
The Drew decision is significant because it recognizes the limitations of the CFAA.  The 
result of the opinion is a blow to the prosecutors who were desperate to charge Drew with 
anything following the public outrage the story generated.  The decision was a good one because 
turning Terms of Service breaches into a federal crime could have potentially opened a 
Pandora’s box of prosecution for even trivial matters and would convert innocent Internet users 
into misdemeanant criminals.   
III. Proposal: Courts Should Apply the Rule of Lenity to Resolve Ambiguity  
This article displays how absurd the results are between Federal courts attempting to 
interpret the CFAA. Until the circuit split gets resolved or Congress decides to amend the statute, 
the courts should apply the rule of lenity in favor of the defendant.
173
  
The rule of lenity rests upon two foundations.  First, it is founded on the fundamental 
principle that no citizen should be subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed.
174
 
Accordingly, “a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world 
will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.”175  Second, the rule 
rests on the principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial 
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department.
176
  Quite simply, within our constitutional framework the legislative power, 
including the power to define criminal acts and to prescribe the punishments to be imposed upon 
those found guilty of them, resides wholly with the Congress.
177
   
The rule of lenity, however, only applies if after reviewing all sources of legislative 
intent, a statute remains ambiguous.
178
 The Supreme Court has also stated that “[t]he rule of 
lenity applies only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, we can make no 
more than a guess as to what Congress intended.  To invoke the rule, we must conclude that there 
is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty.”179  Many critics have stated the CFAA is ambiguous 
because it was poorly written from the beginning.  Also, most judges attempting to interpret the 
statue would agree that the CFAA is very unclear and vague.   This article has proved that there 
is certainly some irreconcilable ambiguity in interpreting the terms “without authorization” and 
“exceeds authorization”.  Therefore, courts should apply a more consistent and clear approach to 
these terms by applying the rule of lenity.   
IV. Conclusion 
 
Congress originally enacted the CFAA as a criminal statute to combat the growing threat 
of computer hackers.  The pivotal point of many federal court decisions are on the terms 
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorization”.  Most courts interpret these two terms 
using the broad view, the narrow view, or the contract-based approach.  The CFAA’s ambiguity 
has led to absurd results.  Since the CFAA is primarily a criminal statute and since it creates both 
civil and criminal liability for violators, courts should apply principles of strict construction of 
criminal laws to interpret the statute.  
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